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Abstract: Following the process initiated by Chile in the early 1980s, most countries in 
South America have undergone deep transformations in their electric industries. In this new 
playing field, the comparison of the relative efficiency of several regional monopolies 
seems to be a potentially valuable tool to reduce the asymmetry of information that is 
involved in the regulator-firm relationship. However, to be useful in the regulatory process, 
productive frontier estimates require a broad set of comparable firms and detailed 
information about them. This availability of data, although a necessary condition, is far 
from sufficient. One must also count on adequate techniques. In this paper we carry out an 
efficiency analysis in the electricity distribution sector in South America using different 
techniques, stating the conditions under which they become a useful tool in crafting an 
efficient regulation of the firms in that sector. Despite the particular results found here, the 
paper underscores the importance of conducting a consistency analysis whenever using 
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Following the process initiated by Chile in the early 1980s, most countries in South 
America have undergone deep transformations in their electric industries, which include 
both restructuring and privatization of the prevailing public monopolies. As a result of these 
processes, a strong change in the role of government has occurred, leaving its producer and 
firm owner roles to become a regulator of those activities that constitute natural monopolies 
(namely transmission and distribution). 
In this new regulatory role, the comparison of the relative efficiency of several 
regional monopolies seems to be a potentially valuable tool to reduce the asymmetry of 
information that is involved in the regulator-firm relationship. This fact has been 
recognized in many of the reform processes in which horizontal break-up of transmission 
and distribution firms was an important ingredient of the transformations. 
In this context, the productive frontier estimates can be helpful to the regulators as a 
tool in the setting of the X factor in a price cap regime of the form RPI-X. This X factor 
reflects the expected price falls due to efficiency gains the firms can achieve during the 
duration of the price cap. These efficiency gains are basically of two types: shifts of the 
frontier and efficiency gains due to catching up. The first of these terms must be included in 
the X factor of all the firms in the sector. That is, if it is expected a productivity growth of 
1% per year, all the firms must have this rate incorporated in the X factor. However, firms 
that are not on the frontier can reduce their costs (and increase their efficiency) in a 
magnitude equal to their current inefficiency. The X factor will include, for each firm, the 
shift of the frontier plus an additional term that will have the purpose of eliminating the 
differences between the firm and the frontier.  
However, to be useful in the regulatory process the productive frontier estimates need 
two conditions to be satisfied. On the one hand, they require a broad set of comparable 
firms and detailed information about them. In this respect CIER’s
1 effort to build up a 
regional database is a fundamental contribution to the development of an efficient 
regulation of electric utilities. But, on the other hand, this availability of data, although a 
necessary condition, is far from sufficient. One must also count on adequate techniques that 
allow an exhaustive analysis of the available data with reference to an appropriate 
conceptual framework.  
The main goal of this paper fits into that criterion. We carry out an efficiency analysis 
in the electricity sector under different approaches
2, stating the conditions under which they 
become a useful tool in crafting an efficient regulation of the firms in that sector. 
The paper outline is as follows. Section II enumerates the consistency conditions and 
how to apply them in a regulatory setting. In Section III, the theoretical model is formulated 
and then estimated, and the different models found in the literature are reviewed. Section 
IV analyses the consistency conditions explained in Section II. Finally, in Section V, 
conclusions to this work are made. 
                                                 
1 CIER accounts for “Comisión de Integración Eléctrica Regional” (Commission of Regional Electricity 
Integration). 
 
2 The technicalities of the different approaches are discussed at length in Rodriguez Pardina et al. (1999).  
 
II. CONSISTENCY CONDITIONS 
A problem faced by regulators willing to apply frontier studies consists in the number 
of methods available for efficiency measurement of individual firms. The following figure 
shows the most common options available to the regulator for efficiency measurement. 
The problem is far more serious if the different approaches give mutually inconsistent 
results. The question then arises at whether are efficiency studies are empirically useful. 
In an attempt to answer this question, Bauer et al. (1998) propose a set of consistency 
conditions which must be met by the efficiency measures obtained from the different 
methodologies for them to be of some use to regulatory authorities.  
These measures ought to be consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings and 
identification of the best and the worst firms, they also ought to be consistent over time and 
with the conditions under which the industry evolves, and they should be consistent with 
other performance measures employed by the regulators. Specifically, the consistency 
conditions are: 
(i)  The efficiency measures generated by the different approaches should have 
similar means and standard deviations; 
(ii)  the different approaches should rank firms in a similar order; 
(iii)  the different approaches should identify, in general, the same firms as the 
“best” and the “worst”;  
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(v)  individual efficiency measures should be rather stable over time, i.e. should 
not vary significantly from one year to the other; and 
(vi)  the different measures should be reasonably consistent with the expected 
results from the industry, given the conditions under which it operates. In the particular 
case of regulated firms, for example, it is expected that those firms regulated under a price 
cap mechanism will be more efficient than those regulated under rate-of-return regulation. 
Broadly speaking, the first three conditions determine the degree to which the 
different approaches are mutually consistent, whereas the remaining conditions establish 
the degree to which the different efficiency measures are consistent with reality. So the last 
three conditions would be like an “external criterion” for the evaluation of the different 
approaches. In other words, the first three conditions say if the different approaches will 
give the same answers to the regulators, while the last three conditions say if it is likely that 
these answers are correct. 
Using efficiency measures in the practice of regulation 
One of the main changes of the last decade in the practice of regulation has been the 
adoption by a large number of regulators of some form of price cap regimes. The main 
purpose of a switch from rate of return regulation to price cap regulation has been to 
increase the incentive for firms to minimize their costs and to ensure that eventually users 
will benefit from these reduction in costs—typically within 3-5 years after a regulatory 
review of improvements in the efficiency in the regulated sector. The adoption of price cap 
regulation is one of the main reasons for this increase in the efforts to measure efficiency in 
regulated sectors. Indeed the observed cost reductions would be associated with efficiency 
gains, which have to be measured. Efficiency measures are no longer a side show as they 
were under rate of return regulation.  
The initial regulatory challenge at the time of a price review is the following. If the 
productivity gain used to assess the new price cap is specific to the firm and based on gains 
achieved by this firm in the past, this firm will not have strong incentives to improve 
efficiency to cut costs because this would result in a lower price cap. An alternative for the 
regulator would be to measure efficiency gains by relying on factors that are not under the 
control of the regulated firm. But in that situation, if the regulator has very little knowledge 
of the past costs of the firm and bases its measure of efficiency gain on, for instance, the 
productivity gains in a related sector in the economy, some perverse effects may penalize 
the firm. This is why the suggestion to rely on yardstick competition is so tempting for 
regulators. Price can be set for an industry based on the aggregate industry performance. 
For instance, the price cap can be based on the average unit cost in the industry rather than 
on the firm specific average unit cost and this gives a strong incentive to the firm to have a 
unit cost below average. In this context, efficiency measures are inputs in the regulatory 
mechanism in an even more direct way than under rate of return regulation. 
The next regulatory challenge is to understand that efficiency gains of a firm can 
come from two main sources, which require some idea on the part of the regulator of where 
the cost frontier lies. Indeed, gains can come from shifts in the frontier reflecting efficiency 
gains at the sectoral level. Efficiency gains at the firm level can also reflect a catching up 
effect. These are the gains to be made by firms not yet on the frontier. These firms should 
be able to achieve not only the industry gain but also specific gains offsetting firm specific  
 
inefficiencies (that explain why the firm is not on the frontier). This is why it is so 
important for a regulator to be able to use all the information provided by frontier based 
measures in the firm specific tariff revision. 
This can be done by recognizing that efficiency indicators are by construction index 
numbers varying from 0 to 1, where 1 reflects the fact that a firm is totally efficient and 0 
that it is completely inefficient (i.e. as far as possible from the sector frontier). For instance, 
if a firm has an efficiency index of 0.8, it means that it could produce the same level of 
output at 80% of its current costs (cost function approach) or produce the same level of 
output using an 80% of its current inputs (production function approach). This means that 
the cap should be based on 80% of current cost, not 100%. With this approach, only the 
firms reaching 100% of efficiency would be allowed to recover their opportunity cost of 
capital while the others would have lower rates of return.
3 
The implementation of this mechanism, however, requires that at the minimum the 
first consistency condition is met (consistency in efficiency levels). If this is not meet, this 
mechanism should not be applied since the individual efficiency measures would be 
somewhat subjective and hence unreliable.  
If the levels of efficiency are not consistent across the different methods of frontier 
estimation, it is still possible that these methods generate similar rankings of firms by their 
efficiency scores. Indeed, identifying the rough ordering of which the firms are more 
efficient than others is usually more important for regulatory policy decisions than 
measuring the level of efficiency (Bauer et al., 1998). For example, identifying the ranking 
would help to discriminate the X factor among the firms in the sector. 
 If nor the first nor the second consistency condition is met, but the third consistency 
rule does (consistency in identifying best and worse performers), it would still be possible 
to use a third approach: to publish the results. This approach is used in the UK in the water 
and electricity sectors. The idea is to inform the users and allow them to compare prices 
and services across regions and give them a reason to put pressure on their own operator if 
it is not performing well. 
 
III. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL  
Sometimes regulated companies differ from one another either because of 
geographical or topological characteristics, factors which difficult the effective employment 
of yardstick competition. However, as Burns and Estache (1998) state, when these 
differences can be unambiguously identified, the regulator still has a potent tool: it may 
simply adjust the prices for each business by the extent of the costs which are outside their 
control. In terms of the construction of the model that means that apart from the standard 
explanatory variables (inputs, in a production function model; output/s and input prices, in 
a cost function model), the model must include a number of additional variables. These 
additional variables are called environmental variables, and their role is to capture external 
                                                 
3 In some cost function applications the efficiency measures are defined as equal or greater than one. In those 
cases, an efficiency measure of 1.2 would be showing that the firm’s expenditure is 20% higher than it could 
be.   
 
factors not directly controllable by the firms, that might influence their performance. Some 
examples of environmental variables include (see Fried, Schmidt and Yaisawarng, 1995): 
•  ownership differences, such as public/private; 
•  location characteristics; 
•  labor union power; and 
•  regulatory regime. 
However, care should be taken as regards the selection of environmental variables to 
be included in the model. In the case of ownership, for example, its inclusion as an 
explanatory variable gives information on the differences in efficiency for each ownership 
type. A set of dummy variables that measure these differences should not be included in a 
model intended for yardstick competition, for ownership effects would be netted out from 
the efficiency measures, thus punishing the firms belonging to the most efficient ownership 
type. If yardstick comparisons are to be made, the model should be estimated without 
dummy variables, and then the results (the relative efficiency measures) should be cross-
checked with ownership information. 
Geographical characteristics, on the other hand, are the kind of variables that should 
in general be included in the model, especially if the location of the firm is given by the 
concession contract (as is the usual case with regional monopolies). Because the firms 
cannot control their geographical environment, the efficiency measures should take into 
account that constraint. Efficiency scores should also incorporate every variable over which 
the firms have no control (climate, labor unions power, etc.).  
Of course, it is clear that yardstick competition requires the regulator to have 
complete information on all those external factors that can affect costs (or the productive 
process). In other cases the possibility exists for the firm to engage in strategic behavior by 
explaining away firm specific inefficiencies as a state of nature (CRI, 1995): if an 
econometric approach were chosen, a firm could always find a variable that only it 
possessed, which, in statistical terms, would work as a dummy variable in the regressions, 
explaining away all the firm’s inefficiency (thus rendering it efficient –or more efficient); 
if, on the other hand, a DEA methodology were employed, a firm could make itself appear 
as more efficient by including additional environmental variables, because it would be 
difficult to find  comparable firms in the set when an increasing number of dimensions is 
considered in the analysis (and not because it is actually efficient).  
Special attention must be taken in relation to the inclusion or not of quality related 
variables. If quality standards do not exist, then the omission of quality variables in the 
model might cause some firms to appear with lower cost not because they are more 
efficient but because they provide a good or service of inferior quality. In these cases, it 
might be convenient to include quality variables in the specification of the model. 
However, the regulator must have in mind that quality levels above reasonable standards 
should be passed to the consumers through higher tariffs. If quality standards do exist, the 
optimal outcome results if the amount of potential fines is included in the computed costs.  
In many cases there are good reasons why some firms do not follow an efficient 
pattern, but once the regulators have done this initial sorting out, the burden of proof should  
 
be on the regulated companies. If they are indeed making the best effort to minimize cost, 
they should have enough information under their exclusive control to show that they are 
doing so and they should provide it to the regulator. This information should then be 
incorporated in any future work the regulators would use to compare companies, and 
become a component of standard informational requirements imposed on all companies 
(Crampes et al., 1997).  
That is to say, the initial model used as a yardstick is not so determinant, since the 
firms can impugn the proposed model until every part (firms and regulators) agree about 
the final model. In this sense, yardstick competition can be viewed as a “learning by doing” 
process in which both firms and regulators learn while playing the game (Rossi and 
Ruzzier, 2000). 
 
Previous models found in the applied literature 
Econometrics 
(1) Neuberg (1977) describes four related but distinguishable activities in electricity 
distribution. Firstly, distribution properly which includes maintenance of equipment and 
installations to users and load dispatch. Secondly, meter reading and billing. Thirdly, sales 
including related activities such as publicity and fourthly administration. Neuberg suggests 
four variables as main cost drivers in electricity distribution: number of customers served, 
total kWh sold, km. of distribution lines and km
2 of distribution area.  
The main conceptual problem is to identify within this set of variables which one or 
ones are the output. Neuberg discards the possibility of treating distribution companies as 
multiproduct firms given that the different variables cannot be separately sold and/or 
priced. For example, once the number of clients is identified as the product (with a price 
equal to average annual revenue per customer of the firm), energy sales in kWh cannot be 
sold separately. Given that the remaining variables cannot be considered outputs (nor inputs 
for which a price is paid) they can be introduced in the model as specific characteristics of 
the firms to allow for comparisons among them. 
Summing up, Neuberg estimates a Cobb-Douglas cost function as follows: 
C = ƒ(Y, Z, Pl, Pk, D), 
where C is the total distribution cost, Y is the output (number of customers served), Z is a 
vector of environmental variables (MWh sold to final customers, miles of overhead 
distribution lines, square miles of service area), Pl is the price of labour, Pk is the price of 
capital, and D is dummy variable which distinguishes between public and privately owned 
firms.  
Neuberg analyses a cross section sample for distribution firms in USA in 1972; 
defining an electricity distribution firm as the one which has nonzero distribution and 
maintenance costs and has at least one residential customer.   
The following are the main results of the paper: 
•  None of the models generates any empirical evidence to support the claim that the 
privately owned firms are more cost efficient than publicly owned firms.  
 
•  There is evidence of increasing returns to scale, though not over the entire existing 
output range.  
•  All the variables are statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence.  
 
(2) Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996), and Burns et al. (1994) add some additional 
variables when compared with Neuberg’s (1977) paper: maximum demand (which 
determines system configuration and size), transform capacity (which affects losses) and 
demand structure (which determines load factors at different moments of the day).  
Summing up, Burns and Weyman-Jones estimate two production functions, one 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology (as Neuberg) and the other assuming a more flexible 
translog technology, which is similar as the Cobb-Douglas but includes the second order 
terms. 
The final model estimated with ordinary least squares is as follows: 
C = ƒ(Y, Z, Pl, Pk, D), 
where C are the operative costs, Y are the customers, Pl and Pk are the prices of labour and 
capital respectively, and Z is a vector of environmental variables (kilometres of distribution 
network, population density, maximum demand, kWh sold, and transformer capacity). The 
variable market structure was excluded from the final model because it was not significant.  
The authors estimate the same model but using generalised least squares (a panel data 
model with random effects), finding that the variables kWh sold, transformer capacity, 
kilometres of distribution network and population density turn into not significant. 
The following are the main results of the paper: 
•  estimation by GLS results in a number of variables becoming statistically insignificant. 
This illustrates the important differences between cross section and panel estimates; 
•  there are significant scale economies in electricity distribution; 
•  most companies’ rankings do not change dramatically with the different approaches; 
•  there is a small but significant positive effect on cost efficiency in the post privatisation 
years.  
 
(3) Pollitt estimates the following cost function (the author’s notation is followed): 
 
DAC = α  + β 1 log SALESC + β 2 (log SALESC)
2 + β 3 MAXRAT + β 4 (MAXRAT)
2 +  
β 5 CUST + β 6 RESID + β 7 OGKMC + β 8 UGKMC + β 9 TRANSC + β 10 WC +  
β 11 AREA + β 12 ODUM + β 13 CDUM 
 
where DAC is distribution cost in 1000s of US dollars per million kWh, SALESC is sales 
per customer in million kWh, MAXRAT is the ratio of maximum to average demand, CUST  
 
is number of customers, RESID is the share of residential sales in total sales, OGKMC is 
overground distribution circuit km per customer, UGKMC  is underground distribution 
circuit km per customer, TRANSC is transformer capacity (in MVA) per customer, WC is 
wage cost in 1000s of US dollars per employee, AREA is service area in square kilometers, 
ODUM is a dummy variable related to ownership (public=1 or private=0), and CDUM is 
another dummy variable that adopts a value of unity when the firm is from UK, and a value 
of zero otherwise. Including the last dummy variable, Pollitt seeks an international 
comparison, though somewhat limited (for he only includes in his sample firm data for two 
countries: UK and USA
4), of the productive efficiency.  
Pollit uses a sample of 145 electricity distribution firms in the accounting year ending 
in 1990. This dataset includes 136 firms from the United States and 9 firms from United 
Kingdom (119 of them were privately owned and 26 were publicly owned).  
The following are the main results of the paper: 
•  The regression explains only 62% of the variation in distribution costs. The F test 
indicates that the regression is significant at 0.1%. 
•  The estimated function indicates the significance of sales per customer, sales per 
customer squared, number of customers, overground circuit km per customer and 
labour costs in explaining the variation in average operation and maintenance costs in 
distribution.  
•  The negative coefficient on the ownership dummy indicates lower costs in public firms. 
However, this coefficient is not significant. 
•  The coefficients on the UK country dummy variable is not significant.  
 
(4) Huettner and Landon (1977), in turn, estimate the following cost function: 
 
DAC = α  + β 1 log TCAP + β 2 (log TCAP)
2 + β 3 UTCAP + β 4 (UTCAP)
2  
+ β 5 NTRANSC + β 6 RESIDC + β 7 COMMC + β 8 INDC + β 9 WC  
+ β 10 GDUMs + β 11 HDUMs 
 
where DAC is distribution cost per kWh, TCAP is total capacity in MW, UTCAP is average 
demand as a ratio of maximum capacity, NTRANSC is number of  line transformers per 
customer, RESIDC is residential sales per customer in MWh, COMMC is commercial sales 
per customer in MWh, INDC is industrial sales per customer in MWh, WC is the company 
wage cost in $/hour, the GDUMs are geographical dummy variables, and the HDUMs are 
holding company dummy variables (related to ownership). 
Huettner and Landon work with a sample of 74 firms and the following are the main 
results of their paper: 
                                                 
4 To the authors’ knowledge, Pollitt’s (1995) work is the first to attempt an international comparison in the 
electricity distribution sector.  
 
•  The reported R
2 for the ordinary least squares regression is 0.60.  
•  The long run average variable cost curve is U-shaped. 
 
(5) Scarsi (1999) analyzes the relative efficiency of the electricity distribution firms 
in Italy for the period 1994-96. The author estimates a cost function with two outputs, three 
inputs and a set of environmental variables. The explained variable is the total distribution 
costs. The input prices considered in the paper are those of materials, capital and labor. 
Two outputs are considered as regressors: GWh sold and number of customers. The 
environmental variables used are: customer density in the service area, market structure (% 
of energy sold to industrial customers), percentage of third-party services, percentage of 
overhead low-voltage lines on total lines, percentage of primary substations on total 
transforming substations, and a set of dummy variables: landscape features (which takes a 
value of 1 if the local zone is made up of more than 50% mountains higher than 770m), 
coastal areas (which takes a value of 1 if the zone includes coastal areas), geographical 
peculiarities (which takes a value of 1 if the distribution zone is located in Southern Italy), 
metropolitan areas (which takes a value of 1 if the zone is serving a metropolitan area), 
political borderline (which might capture externalities coming form interconnected 
neighbouring countries), industrial district (a dummy that takes the value 1 if the zone is in 
the neighbourhood of a municipal distributor to which expensive connection has to be 
granted), and generation plants (which takes a value of 1 if the zone also includes some 
generating plants). 
The following are the main results of the paper: 
•  consumer density was found to be beneficial in terms of total cost minimization;  
•  industrial output (as a percentage of total energy delivered) also contributed to lower 
distribution costs, the same as third-party works;  
•  overhead cables in low-voltage distribution are more expensive than standard 
underground connections;  
•  primary substations raise costs;  
•  the territorial North-South dummy was not statistically significant;  
•  there were not statistically significant differences between privately and publicly owned 
firms; 
•  All coefficients of the variables coastal areas, political borderline, landscape effects, 
metropolitan areas, and industrial district turned out to be statistically insignificant.  
 
(6) Thompson (1997) estimates a translog cost function for the period 1977-92, in the 
United States. Thompson works with 83 firms with data for the years 1977 and 1982, and 
85 firms for the years 1987 and 1992 (he works with data from only these four years).  
The explained variable in the translog cost function is the total power procurement 
and delivery cost. As regressors, the author included the prices of capital and labour, the  
 
output (low-voltage service volumes), and environmental variables (number of customers 
and service territory characteristics). 
The findings of the study suggest that attempts to estimate the costs of the individual 
stages of production of vertically integrated electric utilities could produce biased results 
for some purposes. 
 
(7) Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) analyze the productive efficiency of the 
electricity distribution sector in Sweden for the period 1970-1990, using a hedonic pricing 
approach. 
The following are the main results of the paper: 
•  The privately owned firms are relatively more efficient than the publicly owned ones. 
•  There is evidence of increasing returns to scale. 
•  There is evidence of technical progress in the period 1970-1990. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
(1) Weyman-Jones (1992) uses a DEA model to measure the efficiency of a sample 
of 12 Area Electricity Boards of England and Wales during the period 1970-1 to 1988-9. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of implementing relative 
performance measures for non-competitive firms, thus facilitating yardstick competition. 
Weyman-Jones presents two different models: 
 
Model  W-J  (1992)  1            
Inputs:        Outputs: 
1.  Manpower       1.  Domestic  sales  (kWh) 
2. Network size (km)          2. Commercial sales (kWh) 
3.  Transformers       3.  Industrial  sales  (kWh) 
      4 .   M a x i m u m   d e m a n d   ( k W )  
Model  W-J  (1992)  2            
Inputs:        Outputs: 
1. Manpower            1.   Number of customers 
Environmental variables: 
1.  Network size (km) 
2. Transformers 
3.  Total sales (kWh) 
4.  Maximum demand (kW) 
5. Population  density 
6.  Industrial/total sales (%)  
 
In the first model, the choice of inputs and outputs follows well-established 
conventions in the empirical literature on electricity distribution. The different demand 
categories reflect differences in load (duration of peak, voltage). The input choices 
represent traditional input categories (labor, capital). This model’s objective is to measure 
the technical efficiency of the Area Boards, allowing for variable returns to scale. The 
second model draws on suggestions made by Neuberg (1977), who argued that distribution 
companies are interested in delivering a service to customers; hence total customers should 
be the relevant output. The role of environmental variables is to allow for the measurement 
of productive efficiency in a way that explicitly takes into account the differences in the 
operating environment of the companies. The purpose of this second model is to measure 
overall productive efficiency (including allocative efficiency). 
Weyman-Jones (1992) found that: 
•  Inefficiency has been a characteristic of the Area Boards prior to privatization. 
•  Different Boards moved on to and off the efficient frontier in different years. 
•  Boards should be compared at similar points in their regional economic cycle, rather 
than at the same point in time. 
•  Efficiency improved with the move towards privatization. 
•  The variance of efficiency reduced as the industry approached privatization. 
 
(2) A paper by Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) examines productive efficiency 
and ownership in the Swedish electricity distribution industry, for 285 firms operating in 
1985. They estimate the following DEA model: 
 
M o d e l   H + V              
Inputs:       Outputs: 
1. Labor (hours)          1. High voltage output (MWh) 
2. High voltage lines (km)       2. Low voltage output (MWh) 
3. Low voltage lines (km)       3. High voltage customers (numbers)  
4. Transformer capacity (kVA)      4. Low voltage customers (numbers) 
 
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass also estimate a second model in which they eliminate 
outputs 3 and 4, and a third model with only outputs 3 and 4. 
Their results show that: 
•  Average technical efficiency is low. 
•  Rural distribution companies are relatively scale inefficient. 
•  Ownership, economic organization and service area do not appear to affect efficiency 
scores in a significant way. 
  
 
(3) Pollitt (1995) examines technical efficiency and ownership in a sample of 145 
distribution firms from the USA (136) and the UK (9) in the accounting year ending in 
1990. The dataset includes information on 119 private firms and 26 publicly owned 
companies, and it is divided in three subsamples on the basis of calculated labor employed. 
Pollitt characterizes the distribution function as follows: 
 
M o d e l   P              
Inputs:       Outputs: 
1. Number of employees        1. Number of customers 
2. Transformers (MVA)        2. Residential sales (MWh) 
3. Circuit km.          3. Non-residential sales (MWh) 
      4.  Service  area  (km²) 
      5 .   M a x i m u m   d e m a n d   ( M W )  
 
Inputs 2 and 3 represent the capital input, and input 1, the labor input. On the output 
side, 1 captures the number of nodes to be supplied, and together with 4 it captures density 
effects; 5 captures a load profile; and 2-3 distinguish voltage effects. In another section of 
his work, Pollitt computes four additional measures of efficiency, assuming that (i) input 3 
and output 4, (ii) the former plus output 5, (iii) all of the preceding variables plus input 2, 
and (iv) every variable except input 1 and output 1, are environmental variables. 
The results from the analysis if the distribution sample shows that: 
•  Publicly owned firms outperform their private counterparts, though the null hypothesis 
of no difference between ownership types cannot be rejected 
•  54% of the large firms exhibit increasing returns to scale. 
•  The differences in average efficiency for public and private firms are usually of the 
order of 5% or less. 
 
(4) In a 1998 paper, Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson attempt to examine whether 
ownership or organization of the distribution companies in Sweden has any systematic 
impact on economies of scale, technological change and relative efficiency in labor use, 
and whether there is any evidence that yardstick competition enhances efficiency. The data 
used contains information on a very large number of electricity retail distributors over the 
period 1970-1990, divided into private companies, municipal companies, municipal utilities 
and mixed ownership firms. Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson explore two different DEA 






M o d e l   K + H   1              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Low voltage power lines (km)    1. Low voltage electricity (MWh) 
2. High voltage power lines (km)    2. High voltage electricity (MWh) 
3. Number of employees      3. Low voltage customers 
4. Total transformer capacity (kVA)  4. High voltage customers 
M o d e l   K + H   2              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Number of employees      1. Low voltage electricity (MWh) 
2. Total transformer capacity (kVA)  2. High voltage electricity (MWh) 
    3 .   L o w   v o l t a g e   c u s t o m e r s  
     4.  High  voltage  customers 
5. Low voltage power lines (km) 
6. High voltage power lines (km) 
 
The empirical results found in this study are: 
•  The results are sensitive to variable specification. 
•  There is trend of declining inefficiency across ownership types. 
•  Privately owned firms are relatively more efficient. 
•  Increasing returns to scale are observed most years. 
•  The persistent differences in efficiency scores between private and public firms are 
interpreted to be due to the impact of yardstick regulation. 
 
(5) Weyman-Jones (1991) applies linear programming to the calculation of the 
technical efficiency of the twelve area electricity boards of England and Wales, for the year 
1986/87. The model adopted displays two inputs, capital and labor, and three outputs. 
Labor input is measured as number of employees because no dissagregated measure was 
available. Two different measures of the capital input were considered (giving rise to two 
different models shown below): (i) total value of assets, and (ii) circuit kilometers of mains 
distributions. 
 
Model  W-J  (1991)  1            
Inputs:       Outputs: 
1. Number of employees        1. Sales to domestic consumers (kWh/year) 
2. Valuation of assets (£)        2. Sales to commercial consumers (kWh/year) 
  3. Sales to industrial consumers (kWh/year) 
  
 
Model  W-J  (1991)  2            
Inputs:       Outputs: 
1. Number of employees        1. Sales to domestic consumers (kWh/year) 
2. Mains distribution in service (km)    2. Sales to commercial consumers (kWh/year) 
  3. Sales to industrial consumers (kWh/year) 
 
The main findings of this work are: 
•  The boards differ significantly in efficiency. 
•  The valuation basis of capital services is less able to discriminate between efficient and 
inefficient firms than the physical capital measure. 
•  Only five out of twelve boards operate on the frontier, and two of them dominate the 
reference sets for the seven inefficient firms. 
•  Most of the efficient boards derive relatively little of their efficiency from the 
unregulated commercial and industrial sectors, suggesting that the regulation might be 
too narrowly focused on the domestic segment.  
 
(6) Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2000) benchmark the actual performance of the existing 
distribution network in Spain not against “best practice” standards but against the potential 
performance of an ideal network designed by engineers employed by an international 
consultancy. They measure performance in terms of the cost differential incurred in 
meeting electricity demand and decompose this measure to identify the sources of the 
differences. Their data set describes the 1996 actual performance of Spanish electricity 
distributors and the engineering standards, obtained by aggregation of the detailed 
information generated by the consultancy. Their model is as follows: 
M o d e l   G - T + L              
Inputs:       
1. Low voltage lines (km)    
2. Medium voltage lines (km)   
3. High voltage lines (km)      
4. Substation transformer capacity from high to high & medium voltage, and from medium to medium voltage 
(MVA) 
5. Substation transformer capacity from medium to low voltage (MVA) 
Outputs: 
1. Low voltage customers (#) 
2. Medium & high voltage customers (#) 
3. Service territory area (km2) 
4. Low, medium & high voltage electricity distributed (GWh) 
5. Service reliability [low & medium voltage electricity distributed (MVh) / low & medium voltage electricity 
lost to unplanned interruptions (MVh)]  
 
The empirical findings of this work are: 
•  The existing distribution network operates at a cost that is nearly 40% higher than the 
cost of operating the ideal network. 
•  Over half of the cost saving of operating the consultancy’s ideal network is attributable 
to lower input prices proposed by the consultancy.  
•  The ideal network is not as cost efficient as the existing network. 
•  The source of the superior cost efficiency of the existing network is the superior 
allocative efficiency. 
 
(7) The Netherlands Electricity Regulatory Service (DTe, 2000), in the process of 
introducing price controls for the Dutch electricity sector, analyzed the availability of data 
and the choice of models for benchmarking. Given data limitations, DTe recommended that 
a DEA model be used. DTe modeled the distribution and retail businesses as follows, and 
computed DEA models under both constant and variable returns to scale specifications: 
 
M o d e l   D T e   1              
Input:       Outputs: 
1. Operating expenditures (OPEX)     1. Units distributed 
   2.  Customer  numbers 
 
M o d e l   D T e   2              
Input:       Outputs: 
1. Operating expenditures (OPEX)     1. Units distributed 
   2.  Small  customer  numbers 
   3.  Large  customer  numbers 
 
M o d e l   D T e   3              
Input:       Outputs: 
1. Operating expenditures (OPEX)     1. Units distributed 
   2.  Small  customer  numbers 
   3.  Large  customer  numbers 
   4.  Network  length 






M o d e l   D T e   4              
Input:       Outputs: 
1. Operating expenditures (OPEX)     1. Units distributed 
   2.  Small  customer  numbers 
   3.  Large  customer  numbers 
   4.  Network  length 
   5.  Transformer  numbers 
   6.  Network  density 
M o d e l   D T e   5              
Input:       Outputs: 
1. OPEX plus tangible depreciation    1. Units distributed 
   2.  Customer  numbers 
 
Model DTe1 includes only two key outputs, whereas Model DTe2 attempts to capture 
differences in the composition of each company’s customer base. The third model adds 
variables that proxy the dispersion of the customer base and the complexity of the network, 
and Model DTe4 further incorporates network density (network length per customer) as a 
proxy for network dispersion. The last model is similar to the first one, but uses an 
extended input concept.  
The results of the study reveal that: 
•  There is a considerable spread of relative inefficiency among the companies. 
•  There is scope for efficiency improvement, particularly among larger companies. 
•  Constant returns to scale models are more appropriate than variable returns to scale 
models. 
 
(8) Kittelsen (1999) examines the theoretical and practical possibilities and problems 
in using yardstick competition based on cost information from the DEA methodology. The 
author uses a stepwise procedure to select the specification of variables in the model for the 
Norwegian Electricity Distribution Utilities: 
 
M o d e l   K              
Inputs:       Outputs: 
1.  Labor       1.  Energy  delivered 
2. Energy loss          2. Number of customers 
3. Transformers          3. Line length 1-24 kV 
4. Lines 
5. Goods and services  
 
The variables that were eliminated included corrosion index, climatic index, 
maximum power and disaggregation of energy by institutional customer groups. The main 
findings of the analysis are: 
•  Mean technical efficiency: 0.93 
•  Mean technical productivity: 0.90 
•  Mean cost efficiency: 0.81 
•  Mean total efficiency: 0.77 
•  Mean Malmquist Productivity change: 1.9% p.a. 1983-1989. 
 
(9) Scarsi (1999) analyses the technical efficiency of local electricity distribution in 
Italy by means of econometric and linear programming (DEA) tools. A pooled sample of 
76 firms (37 municipal firms and 39 ENEL –the Italian electricity monopolist- zones) for 
the years 1994, 1996 was built, and DEA was used to cross-check the results obtained with 
a stochastic frontier (econometric) approach. DEA computations were made under an 
output orientation (maximization of outputs with fixed inputs). This orientation was chosen 
because Italian firms are not strictly compelled to provide customers with whatever 
electricity they desire at given (regulated) prices, and because inputs are assumed to be 
moderately fixed in the short run. Scarsi estimates three different models, assuming 
variable returns to scale, which are shown below. 
 
M o d e l   S   1              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Employees        1. Energy delivered (GWh/year) to final customers 
2. Km. of distribution lines    2. Number of customers 
M o d e l   S   2              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Employees        1. Number of customers 
2. Km. of distribution lines 
M o d e l   S   3              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Employees        1. Energy delivered (GWh/year) to final customers  
2. Km. of distribution lines 
 
Energy delivered to final customers include sales to industrial customers, publicly-
owned enterprises and residential (both urban and rural) users. Employees stands for the 
number of full-time employees (end-year average). Scarsi found that: 
•  Pooled analysis failed to spot any systematic superiority of ENEL units over 
municipalities.  
 
•  Statistical testing showed limited agreement between both econometric and DEA 
approaches on efficiency outcomes. 
 
(10) Burns and Weyman-Jones (1994) use mathematical programming techniques to 
construct measures of relative efficiency and productivity growth in a multiple input, 
multiple output model of UK electricity distribution before and after privatization. The 12 
Regional Electricity Companies of England and Wales are compared over the years 1971-
1993. The choice of inputs and outputs in this study is as follows: 
 
M o d e l   B + W              
Inputs:      Outputs: 
1. Number of full time employees    1. Number of customers 
2. Distribution network (circuit km)  2. Units delivered to domestic consumers (kWh) 
3. Transformer capacity (MVA)    3. Units delivered to commercial consumers (kWh) 
          4. Units delivered to industrial consumers (kWh) 
     5.  Maximum  demand  (kW) 
Environmental variables: 
1. Customer density (number of customers per square km. of company territory) 
2. Market structure (share of industrial energy delivered in total) 
 
The authors found that: 
•  The null hypothesis that productivity growth before and after privatization has been the 
same cannot be rejected. 
•  The industry is performing more efficiently since privatization, but this effect is solely 
due to secular technical progress, with no incremental efficiency gain. 
•  There is a wider diversity of performance amongst the companies compared with their 
performance under state ownership. 
 
Summary of previous models 
In the following table we summarize every previous works we have mentioned here, 
highlighting the specification used (cost vs. production, econometrics vs. mathematical 
programming), the output/s, the inputs and the environmental variables chosen. In 
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Customers   Labor, capital  Maximum demand, area of 
service, consumer density, 
kWh sold, market structure, 




Cost function  High and low 
voltage sales 
Labor (transmission and 
distribution), power, 
capital (transmission and 
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low and high voltage lines
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Capital, labor, materials  Customer density, market 
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length 1-24 kV 
Labor, energy loss, 
transformers, lines, goods 
and services. 
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voltage lines, substation 
transformer capacity 
 
In Appendix 2 we make a more detailed description of those variables that, in our 
belief, need such a description. 
 
Our econometric model 
Since we are attempting an international comparison, and since in many of the 
analyzed countries the electricity firms are publicly owned, in this paper we estimate a 
production frontier.
5 The stochastic production function model (Cobb-Douglas
6) with panel 
data is written as: 
Yit = β 0 + X’it β  + ε it, 
where Yit is the natural logarithm of the output of firm i (i=1, 2,...,N) at time t (t=1,2,...,T), 
Xit is the corresponding matrix of k inputs (and environmental variables, also in logs) and β  
is a k× 1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The error term is specified as 
ε it = vit – uit. 
The vit are statistical noise and are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed, while uit are non-negative random variables which represent technical 
efficiency. The vit represent those effects that cannot be controlled by the firm, such as 
measurement errors, omitted variables and weather conditions. Technical inefficiency, on 
the other hand, accounts for those factors that can be controlled by the firm, and can be 
defined as the discrepancy between a firm’s actual and potential outputs. 
Since it is not convenient in empirical applications to impose to the model an a priori 
distribution of the inefficiency term, we use the more flexible truncated normal distribution 
proposed by Stevenson (1980). This distribution is obtained by truncating at zero a normal 
distribution with median µ  and variance σ
2. Setting µ  to zero reduces to the traditional half-
normal model. To represent the temporal evolution of the inefficiency term we use the 
model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992). 
An important advantage of this model is its great flexibility, which allows the testing 
of different specifications in order to choose the one that best fits the data. In this paper we 
                                                 
5 The estimation of cost frontiers involves the utilization of variables measured in monetary units (data on 
costs as well as on input prices is needed), which could be a serious problem if one wishes to make 
international comparisons. Production functions, instead, only require variables measured in physical units 
(i.e. homogeneous among countries –or at least much homogeneous). Additionally, whenever there is public 
ownership the firms, in general, would not seek profit maximization as their main goal. As Pestieu and 
Tulkens (1990) argue, public enterprises do not share the same objectives and constraints that their private 
counterparts do, so their relative performance should only be compared on the basis of technical efficiency. 
Besides, in public firms, prices may be neither available nor reliable (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). 
6 We did not estimate a translog cost function, which is a more flexible form, because the inclusion of the 
second order and cross terms would leave the model with very few degrees of freedom.   
 
test the hypothesis that the inefficiency term has a half-normal distribution (H0: µ =0) vis a 
vis the more flexible truncated (at zero) normal. We also contrast the hypothesis that the 
inefficiency is time invariant (H0: η =0), and the null that there is no technical change in the 
analyzed period.  
The next important decision we have to make is the choice of the variables to include 
in the model. Neuberg (1977) describes four related but distinguishable activities in 
electricity distribution. First, distribution properly which includes maintenance of 
equipment and installations to users and load dispatch. Second, meter reading and billing. 
Third, sales including related activities such as publicity, and fourth, administration. 
Neuberg suggests four variables as main cost drivers in electricity distribution: number of 
customers served, total kWh sold, Km of distribution lines and Km
2 of distribution area. 
Burns et al. (1994) add some additional variables: maximum demand (which determines 
system configuration and size), transformer capacity (which affects losses) and demand 
structure (which determines load factors at different moments of the day).  
The main conceptual problem is to identify within this set of variables which one or 
ones are the output. Neuberg discards the possibility of treating distribution companies as 
multiproduct firms given that the different variables cannot be separately sold and/or 
priced. For example, once the number of clients is identified as the product (with a price 
equal to average annual revenue per customer of the firm), energy sales in (kWh) cannot be 
sold separately. This is the road we follow in the estimations, taking number of customers 
as the (single) output in our production function. Given that the remaining variables cannot 
be considered outputs (nor inputs for which a price is paid) they can be introduced in the 
model as specific characteristics of the firms to allow for comparisons among them. 
The initial estimated production function is therefore: 
 
Ln CUSTOMER = β 0 + β 1 Ln KMNET + β 2 Ln EMPLOYEE + β 3 Ln TRANSF  
+ β 4 Ln AREA + β 5 Ln STRUCT + β 6 TIME 
 
where Ln stands for natural logarithm. The dependent variable is the number of customers 
(CUSTOMER), and the regressors are: distribution lines (KMNET, in km), number of 
employees in distribution (EMPLOYEE), service area (AREA, in km
2), transformer 
capacity (TRANSF, in kV), and proportion of sales to residential customers (a proxy of  
market structure, STRUCT). We include a time trend (TIME) in the model to account for 
technical change.  
The data 
The raw data used in this work has been obtained from the Secretaría General de la 
Comisión de Integración Eléctrica Regional (CIER) reports, “Datos Estadísticos. Empresas 
Eléctricas. Año 1994”, and “Datos Estadísticos. Empresas Eléctricas. Años 1995-1996-
1997”. The database includes information about a large number of variables for the 
following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. After cleaning the database we obtained an unbalanced panel with  
 
99 observations for a total of 35 firms in the period 1994-97. The summary statistics of the 




Variable Sample  Size  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Customers  99  520688  854816 
Residential/Total Sales (%)  99  41  15 
Mains of Distribution (km)  99  107244  326034 
Transformer Capacity (kVA)  99  1236911  1876080 
Concession Area (km
2) 99  76704  164473 
Sales (MWh)  99  3421278  6524999 
Number of Employees in Distribution  99  716  1539 
 
 
We start our estimates with a flexible model and then we test different specifications 
using a LR test, which requires the estimation of the model under both the null and the 
alternative hypotheses. The statistic is calculated as 
LR = -2[LR - LU], 
where LR is the log-likelihood of the restricted model (i.e., the half-normal specification) 
and LU is the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model. The LR statistic has a chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions involved (in this 
instance one). 
In a first step we test the null hypothesis that there are no technical inefficiency 
effects in the model. Comparing the log-likelihood of the ML and OLS model (not shown) 
we found that there are significant differences between them.
7 Since the LR statistic is 
greater than the critical value (one degree of freedom), the null that there are no technical 
inefficiency effects in the sample can be rejected.
8  
The next step is to test the half-normal model versus the alternative truncated normal. 
The log likelihood function of the unrestricted model is not significantly different from the 
log likelihood of the restricted (µ =0) model. Since we cannot reject the null, in the final 
model the efficiency component is assumed to have a half-normal distribution. 
Finally, we test the time invariant inefficiency effect hypothesis. We do so by running 
two models, one with the parameter η  and another without it. The log likelihood of the 
unrestricted model is 58.2, which is not significatively greater than the log likelihood of the 
restricted (57.2, when η =0) model. Since the LR test cannot reject the null H0: η =0, we do 
not include η  in the model.  The ML estimates are presented in column A of table 3. Since 
                                                 
7 Some difficulties arise in testing the null Ho: γ =0 because γ =0 lies on the boundary of the parameter space 
for γ . In this case, if the null is correct the LR statistic has asymptotic distribution, which is mixture of chi-
square distributions. The rule of thumb for a test of size α  is: “Reject Ho if LR exceeds the chi-square value 
for a size 2α ” (Coelli et al., 1998). 
8 The ML estimate of γ  is 0.997, value, which reinforces the conclusion above.   
 
we cannot reject the time invariant efficiency hypothesis, we also estimate a deterministic 


































The dependent variable is Ln CUSTOMER. The t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
In both the ML and GLS models all the inputs have the right sign and are significant 
at the usual levels of confidence. In both models AREA has an unexpected sign, though in 
the ML model it is not significant. The sign of AREA is a problem from a regulatory 
perspective, since it says that, ceteris paribus, the model demands more output from a firm 
that has a larger concession area. The only not significant variable (in both models) is 
STRUCT.  
Technical change can be analyzed through the coefficients of the variable TIME.
10 
The total rate of technical change is obtained as the first derivative of the natural logarithm 
of the production function with respect to time, dLnCUSTOMER/dTIME, which in this 
particular case is equal to β 6. In the ML model β 6 = 0.024 and in the GLS model β 6 = 0.029. 
These values can be interpreted as constant annual growth rates and shows a positive shift 
in the technical frontier of the electricity distribution sector as a hole in South America.  
 
The DEA estimates 
In order to allow for the comparison of the results, we used the same model as in the 
last section to perform the non-parametric estimation, i.e. we have a model with only one 
output
11 (number of customers), three inputs (labor, km of distribution lines, and 
transformer capacity in kV), and two environmental variables (concession area and a proxy 
                                                 
9 For the ML estimates, we use FRONTIER 4.1, written by Coelli (1996). For the GLS estimates we use 
EVIEWS. 
10 In this case it has no sense to construct a Malmquist Index since there is not a catching up effect (the 
efficiency is time invariant). 
11 Though DEA is suitable for multi-output environments, as stated above. The need to compare, however, 
prevails.  
 
for market structure). The orientation chosen is to the proportional reduction in inputs 
achievable by a firm while maintaining the level of output. We considered two alternative 
assumptions about the returns to scale: constant returns to scale (DEA-C) and variable 
returns to scale (DEA-V).  
The theoretical specification of the DEA-C model consists in an optimization 
problem subject to constraints, like the following: 
λ min  
to s.   . , , ,
n R z e zE x zX zU u + ∈ = ≤ ≤ λ  
This problem gives as a solution the proportion (λ ) in which the observed inputs of 
the firm being analyzed could be reduced if they were used efficiently. U is a n*r matrix of 
outputs of the firms in the sample (n denoting the number of firms and r the number of 
outputs). X is a n*m matrix of inputs of the sample firms (m indexing considered inputs). E 
is a n*s matrix containing all the information about s environmental variables of the n 
firms.  u,  x and e are the observed output, input and environmental variables vectors, 
respectively, of the firm under evaluation. Finally, z is a vector of intensity parameters (z1, 
z2, ..., zn) that allows for the convex combination of the observed inputs and outputs (in 
order to build the envelopment surface). 
To obtain the second model, DEA-V, it suffices to add the following constraint to the 







i z  
As shown in Coelli et al. (1998), the technical efficiency scores obtained from DEA-
C can be decomposed into pure technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency, which 
measures the average product of the firm under consideration relative to the average 













EMSA  0.390 0.394 0.990 
EDET  0.693 0.700 0.991 
EDENOR 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CRE  0.419 0.428 0.979 
CEB  0.449 0.451 0.996 
CELG  0.981 0.982 0.999 
CEMAT 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CEMIG  1.000 1.000 1.000 
CESP  0.907 0.916 0.991 
COPEL  1.000 1.000 1.000 
CONAFE 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 
EDELMAG  1.000 1.000 1.000 
CHEC  1.000 1.000 1.000 
EEPPM  0.940 0.980 0.959 
ENERCALI  0.993 0.993 1.000 
EPSA  0.901 1.000 0.901 
ESSA  0.687 0.694 0.991 
EEQSA  0.783 0.785 0.997 
EERCSCA  0.615 0.621 0.990 
EERSSA 0.916 0.934 0.981 
ELEPCOSA  0.993 1.000 0.993 
EMELMANABI  0.671 0.678 0.990 
ANDE  0.461 0.504 0.915 
ELC  1.000 1.000 1.000 
ELECTRO  SUR  0.701 0.742 0.945 
LUZ DEL SUR  0.841  0.843  0.997 
SEAL  0.934 0.940 0.994 
UTE  0.483 0.523 0.924 
CALEV  0.999 1.000 0.999 
CALEY  1.000 1.000 1.000 
ELECAR 0.988 0.999 0.989 
ELEGGUA  1.000 1.000 1.000 
ELEVAL 0.975 0.977 0.998 
ENELCO 0.585 0.628 0.932 
ENELVEN  0.647 0.757 0.855 
 
In the results it would be expected to find that the efficiency measures are lower for 
the DEA-C case than for the DEA-V case (fewer firms are found efficient in the former); 
and it should also be found that firms labeled efficient in the first model are also considered 
efficient in the second. Both expectations are confirmed by the results. The mean of the 
efficiency measures was .827 and .842 for DEA-C and DEA-V respectively.  
 
IV. CONSISTENCY CONDITIONS ANALYSIS 
Results of previous studies 
Although there is a vast literature on efficiency measurement in the utilities sector, 
few studies try to compare the efficiency measures obtained with different approaches. 
Among them, there are the works of Pollitt (1995), Ray and Murkherjee (1995), and Burns 
and Weyman-Jones (1996). The first two studies compare parametric and non-parametric 
measures, while the latter compares only parametric measures. 
Ray and Murkherjee (1995) apply the DEA methodology to a sample consisting of 
123 electricity firms, the same sample used by Greene (1990), though this author applies 
the stochastic frontier approach (under different assumptions about the distribution of the 
inefficiency term). From the comparison of both studies it is concluded that DEA results 
are consistent with those of SPF whenever the inefficiency term has a gamma or half-
normal distribution. The consistency result is weaker for other distributions of the 
inefficiency term.  
 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996), in turn, compare the efficiency rankings stemming 
from DFA-R and SPF methodologies. Correlation between both rankings turned out to be 
0.395, rejecting the hypothesis of zero correlation at the 95% significance level. In support 
of the consistency between the models, the authors show that both approaches identify the 
same firms as the most or least efficient. 
Pollitt (1995) compares the DEA, DPF and SPF approaches in the case of electric 
power plants, finding correlations ranging from 0.57 to 0.95. According to the author, the 
results of the application of the different methodologies reveal a relatively high correlation 
between the rankings derived from the various techniques, specially a very high correlation 
between both parametric approaches. However, when the same exercise is performed in the 
case of base load power plants, lower correlations than in the former case obtains.  
Finally, Rodríguez Pardina et al. (1999) made an international comparison of the 
relative efficiency of the firms in the electricity distribution sector and found that, broadly 
speaking, the different approaches are consistent in their means, rankings and identification 
of the same firms as the “best” and the “worst” (internal consistency). Moreover, they 
found that there exists a positive (but close to zero) correlation between the diverse 
efficiency measures and the partial productivity indices usually used to measure firms’ 
performances (this is the only external condition tested by the authors). 
The literature is far more extensive in sectors other than electricity, and the results are 
diverse (see Bauer et al., 1998, for a discussion of these results in the financial sector). A 
detailed analysis of the consistency conditions, however, has not yet been attempted in the 
utilities sector. 
An interesting conclusion reached by Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) is that the 
non-parametric and stochastic approaches provide the lower and upper bounds respectively 




In this paper, four different approaches have been used to estimate the efficiency 
measures: DEA with constant returns to scale (DEA-C), DEA with variable returns to scale 
(DEA-V), stochastic parametric approach estimated with panel data and maximum 
likelihood (DFA-ML) and deterministic parametric frontier estimated with GLS (DPF-
GLS). To ensure comparability, the four techniques use the same efficiency concept 
(technical efficiency), the same sample of firms (unbalanced panel of 35 firms for the 
period 1994-1997, 99 observations), equal specifications of inputs (employees, kilometers 
of net and transformer capacity), environmental variables (concession area and market 
structure) and output (customers), and (for parametric methods) the same functional form 
(Cobb-Douglas production function). The consistency conditions sketched in Section II will 





(i) Comparison of the distribution of the efficiency measures across the different 
approaches 
Table 5 presents the efficiency measures and the respective ranking for all the firms 
in the sample for the four approaches.  
 
Table 5 










Measure Ranking Measure Ranking Measure Ranking  Measure  Ranking
EMSA 0.390  35  0.394  35  0.1478  35  0.217  35 
EDET 0.693  25  0.700  26  0.2809  20  0.394  20 
EDENOR 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.0000 1  0.972  1 
CRE 0.419  34  0.428  34  0.1874  32  0.272  33 
CEB 0.449  33  0.451  33  0.3136  16  0.366  22 
CELG 0.981  15  0.982  16  0.4685  7  0.635  4 
CEMAT 1.000 1 1.000 1  0.5403  3  0.932  3 
CEMIG 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.4661  8  0.514  10 
CESP 0.907  20  0.916  21  0.3538  14  0.421  17 
COPEL 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.5353  4  0.603  5 
CONAFE 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.3593  13  0.517  8 
EDELMAG 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.2570 23 0.359  24 
CHEC 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.3701  11  0.511  11 
EEPPM 0.940  17  0.980  17  0.4777  6  0.497  13 
ENERCALI 0.993  12  0.993  15 0.5012  5 0.567 6 
EPSA  0.901 21 1.000  1 0.3107  17  0.442  15 
ESSA 0.687  26  0.694  27  0.2373  26  0.316  28 
EEQSA 0.783  23  0.785  23  0.3639  12  0.459  14 
EERCSCA 0.615 29 0.621 30 0.2090  29  0.298  32 
EERSSA 0.916  19  0.934  20  0.1879  31  0.321  27 
ELEPCOSA 0.993  13  1.000  13 0.2441 24 0.408  18 
EMELMANABI 0.671  27  0.678  28  0.2245  27  0.336  25 
ANDE 0.461  32  0.504  32  0.2791  21  0.379  21 
ELC 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.2967  19  0.515  9 
ELECTRO SUR  0.701  24  0.742  25  0.1793  33  0.312  29 
LUZ DEL SUR  0.841  22  0.843  22  0.4545  9  0.524  7 
SEAL 0.934  18  0.940  19  0.3038  18  0.510  12 
UTE 0.483  31  0.523  31  0.3312  15  0.403  19 
CALEV  0.999 11 1.000  1 0.5479 2 0.949  2 
CALEY 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.2184  28  0.360  23 
ELECAR 0.988  14  0.999  14  0.4055  10  0.435  16 
ELEGGUA 1.000  1  1.000  1  0.1902 30 0.307  30 
ELEVAL 0.975  16  0.977  18  0.2645  22  0.321  26 
ENELCO 0.585 30 0.628  29  0.1621  34  0.224  34 
ENELVEN 0.647 28 0.757 24 0.2379 25  0.303  31 
 





Consistency Condition (i) 
Approach DEA-C  DEA-V DPF-GLS  DFA-ML 
Mean  0.827 0.842 0.340 0.454 
Median  0.934 0.977 0.304 0.408 
Deviation  0.208 0.201 0.164 0.186 
Maximum  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 
Minimum  0.390 0.394 0.148 0.217 
Sample  35 35 35 35 
 
As it was expected, average efficiency is higher in the stochastic approach than in the 
parametric deterministic methodology. The comparison between the parametric and non-
parametric approaches concludes that the latter show a higher mean, probably reflecting the 
bias of having two many variables relative to the number of observations or that the firms 
are very heterogeneous (remember that a necessary condition was a broad set of 
comparable firms). 
The Kruskal-Wallis (non-parametric) test was carried out to test the null hypothesis 
that the four populations from where the samples came have identical population medians, 
and we cannot reject the null. 
(ii) Correlation between rankings 
Table 7 contains the coefficients of Spearman’s ranking correlations, which show the 
existing relationship between each ranking and the others. All the correlations are positive, 
and significantly different from zero at the usual levels of confidence. According to these 
results, consistency condition (ii) would be met among the different approaches. 
 
Table 7 
Consistency Condition (ii) 
Approach DEA-C  DEA-V DPF-GLS  DFA-ML 
DEA-C  1.000  0.925** 0.375* 0.512** 
DEA-V   1.000  0.348*  0.489** 
DPF-GLS     1.000  0.930** 
DFA-ML      1.000 
* correlation significatively distinct from zero at a 5% level, two tails. 
** correlation significatively distinct from zero at a 1% level, two tails. 
 
(iii) Identification of the same firms as “best” and “worst” 
The upper triangle of the matrix displayed in Table 8 shows, for each pair of 
approaches, the fraction of firms that both approaches simultaneously classified in the 
upper third (12 firms). The lower triangle of the matrix shows the same for the case of the  
 
lower third (12 firms, also, leaving 11 firms in the middle third). It is worth mentioning that 
if the fraction were purely random, it would be expected to be around 33.3%. 
 
Table 8 
Consistency Condition (iii) 
Approach DEA-C  DEA-V DPF-GLS  DFA-ML 
DEA-C    0.916 0.583 0.750 
DEA-V 1.000    0.500  0.666 
DPF-GLS 0.666  0.666    0.750 
DFA-ML  0.666 0.666 0.833   
 
These results appear to imply that condition (iii) is being met. The advantage of 
knowing if the different approaches are consistent relative to the identification of firms as 
the “best” or the “worst” is that, even in the case of no fulfillment of the first two 
consistency conditions, it would be possible to use a mechanism like the one employed by 
OFWAT, which publishes the efficiency rankings in the media as a reward or a punishment 
to the firms. 
(iv) Consistency with other performance measures 
Partial productivity measures, though theoretically inferior to efficiency frontiers, are 
used as a complement to frontier analysis.
12 This external condition requires the efficiency 
measures generated by the different approaches to be positively correlated with the partial 
productivity measures, although the correlations must be far away from unity (Bauer et al., 
1998). Table 9 shows the performance measure used in checking condition (iv): 
 
Table 9 
Partial Productivity Measures 
Measure Mean  Deviation  Sample  Maximum  Minimum 
Customers/ 
Employee 
1252 1268  35  6884  397 
Sales/ 
Employee 
6277 6390  35  29123  1244 
 
Table 10 displays the correlations between the partial productivity measure and the 







                                                 
12 These partial productivity measures fail mainly because they do not take into account the possibility of 
input substitution. Moreover, they do not recognize the existence of variables beyond the firm’s control. 
However, they are widely used as complements to efficiency frontier estimations. One of the reasons for their 
usefulness may be that they can point out measurement errors in the data (e.g. an implausible value in an 
output/input ratio).   
 
Table 10 
Consistency Condition (iv) 
Approach Sales/Employee  Customers/Employee 
DEA-C 0.117  0.230 
DEA-V 0.150  0.225 
DPF-GLS 0.262  0.294 
DFA-ML 0.385  0.468 
 
According to Table 10, condition (iv) would be met because all the correlations are 
positive and far from unity. Moreover, it can be observed that the correlations tend to be 
higher when customers are used as output in the construction of partial productivity indices 
(the same choice as in frontier estimation). 
(v) Individual efficiency measures should be rather stable over time  
As discussed above, to be useful for regulatory purposes, it is important that the 
efficiency measures be reasonably stable over time. Though some firms may marginally 
improve or worsen their performance over short periods of time, it is unlikely that a very 
efficient firm in one year would become very inefficient in the next, only to return to high 
efficiency in the following year (Bauer et al., 1998). We now determine the year-to-year 
stability of DEA-C and DEA-V efficiency estimates over time. We do not include both 
parametric approaches (DPF and DFA) because we were not able to reject the null 
hypothesis that the efficiency was constant over time (so we already know that the 
measures generated by DPF and DFA are stable). We calculated the correlations for each of 
the two time-varying efficiency measures between each pair of years. That is, we computed 
the correlation between DEA-C efficiency measures in year i, i=1994, ..., 1997, and DEA-C 
efficiency scores in year j, j=1995, 1996, 1997, with j>i to avoid redundancy, and then 
repeated this process for the DEA-V approach. Table 11 presents the average correlations 
by the number of years apart. In general, the n-year apart figures are averages of the 4-n 
correlations between efficiencies that are n years away from each other.  
 
Table 11 
Consistency Condition (v) 
Approach  1 year apart  2 year apart  3 year apart 
DEA-C 0.901  0.925  0.865 
DEA-V 0.899  0.941  0.886 
 
The correlations are high and statistically significant over all the available lags for 
both methods examined, suggesting that the non-parametric efficiency scores are stable 
over time and giving support to the results obtained in the parametric estimates. 
(vi) The different measures should be reasonably consistent with the expected results 
from the industry, given the conditions under which it operates 
At the end of 1997, several of the countries in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia and Peru) had undergone a restructuring process in their electricity sectors. 
The reforms included 15 firms out of 35 in our sample (leaving 20 firms in non-reforming 
countries).  
 
One of the main objectives of all these restructuring processes was productive 
efficiency, so one would expect to find that the relative efficiency of the firms in the 
reforming countries is higher than that of the other firms. To test this hypothesis, we used 
the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test (as in condition (i)), and found that the null 
hypothesis of no differences between both groups can be rejected at the usual levels of 
significance. Therefore, the results are consistent with the a priori expectations, and 




The present work made an international comparison of the relative efficiency of the 
firms in the electricity distribution sector. To achieve such a goal, it used different 
methodologies that allowed the construction of several efficiency rankings, on which a 
consistency analysis was performed. That analysis showed that, broadly, the different 
approaches are consistent in their means, rankings and identification of the same firms as 
the “best” and the “worst” (internal consistency). Moreover, the external consistency 
conditions are also met.  
Despite the particular results found here on the consistency conditions, the paper 
underscores the importance of conducting a consistency analysis whenever using efficiency 
measures in applied regulation.  
Thinking about the future, this kind of work highlights the importance of having 
homogeneous databases in the different countries in order to make the comparisons. In this 
sense, it is important to note the work of the Comisión de Integración Eléctrica Regional 
(CIER), source of the information on which this study was based. 
                                                 
13 A similar result is found in Rodríguez Pardina and Rossi (1999), but using a different methodology.  
 
APPENDIX 1  
Table A-1 
Previous Studies: Electricity Transmission  
Author/s  Specification/ 






utilization of total 
capacity (%) 




sales (% of total), industrial 
sales (% of total), utility-
muni sales (% of total), and 
a set of regional dummy 
variables and of holding 
companies dummy 
variables 
Pollit, 1995  Cost function, 
Econometrics 
Circuit km*voltage 
level, ratio of 
maximum to 
average demand,  
Labor  Percentage of residential 
sales in total, lenght of 
underground circuits (km), 
lenght of overhead circuits 
(km), transformer capacity 
(MVA), and a dummy 
variable for ownership 










demand, route km 
 





















Circuit km*voltage level 
(kV), circuit km 








Circuit km*voltage level 
(kV), circuit km, maximum 
system demand 






Circuit km*voltage level 













Area, population density, 
mains length (km), 
transformer numbers, share 
of underground cables (%)  
 
Table A-2 
Previous Studies: Water 
Author/s  Specification












% of water distributed to 
nonresidents 





Water distributed Ground water, surface 
water, purchased water, 
miles of pipeline, part-
time labor, full-time labor, 
storage capacity 
 
Stewart, 1993  Cost function, 
Econometrics 
Volume of water 
delivered 
  Length of mains, % of sales 
to non-households, Average 
pumping head, % of 
distribution input from 
groundwater 
Bhattacharyya 




Water supplied  Energy, labor, materials  Water input, population 
density, capital
14, % of 
metered connections, 
distribution pipe length, 
system water loss, and a set 
of dummy variables
15 





16 Labor, Capital  Number of connections, 
number of connections per 
employee, the ratio of billed 





Customers  Labor  Population density, number 
of connections, number of 
hours of water availability, % 
of residential sales, and a 
dummy concessionaire firm 
 
Table A-3 
Previous Studies: Gas Distribution  
Author/s  Specification


















Labor  Kilometers of pipes, 
concession area, % or 
residential sales, total sales, 
maximum demand 





Kilometers of network, 
employees 
Concession area, maximum 
demand, % of residential 
sales 
                                                 
14 Capital is defined as the current value of the water utilities’ assets. 
15 These are: Firms treating water, firms with surface water, firms with groundwater, firms with water and 
sewer. 
16 In a second model the authors also include water volume billed. 
17 Though the authors include control variables, they do not explicit them.  
 
APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS OF THE VARIABLES 
Here we make a more detailed description of those variables that, in our belief, need 
such a description. 
 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1994) 
Customer density: number of customers per square kilometer of company territory. 
Market structure: the share of industrial energy delivered in total energy delivered. 
Labor: number of full time equivalent employees. 
Capital 1: size of the distribution network in circuit kilometers. 
Capital 2: size of network reinforcement by transformer capacity (megavoltamps). 
 
Pollitt (1995) 
Labor costs: Average salary in 1000s of US dollars in the utility. This is total wages and 
salaries divided by the number of full-time employees plus half the number of part-time 
employees. UK data has been converted to US dollars using a Purchasing Power Parity 
exchange rate of 0.609. 
Operation and Maintenance Costs: Operation and maintenance costs in distribution in 
1000s US dollars. This figure includes rent but not depreciation. UK data has been 
converted to US dollars using a Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate of 0.609. UK data 
include operation and maintenance costs of 132 and 66 kV lines, which are not counted as 
part of the distribution system. This implies UK labor and average cost data are biased 
upwards when compared to US data. 
Labor: Number of employees in the distribution function. This figure is derived by dividing 
operation and maintenance costs in distribution by the labor cost. This gives a labor 
equivalent operation and maintenance cost. 
Peak Output: Maximum demand on the system in MW.  
 
Scarsi (1999) 
Total Distribution Costs: It is made up of capital and labor costs, plus materials (goods and 
services supplied by third parties), which are seen as residual cost components. 
Price of Labor: Obtained as the ratio between labor cost and average number of employees, 
without including part-time jobs.
18 
Price of Capital: Computed as the ratio between capital costs and the length of distribution 
lines. As the author says, this is clearly a proxy value for the user cost of capital. 
Within a cross-sectional analysis, no correction for either depreciation or real interest rates 
is needed. The unit cost of capital should be calculated as (KCOST (r+δ ))/K, where 
                                                 
18 The author states that part-time jobs are not common in Italian electricity sector.  
 
KCOST is the historic cost of capital, r is the real interest rate, δ  is the depreciation charge 
for each period, and K is the quantity of capital in physical terms. This formula intends to 
represent the rental price of capital, which includes an arbitrary depreciation charge. 
Price of materials: Computed as the ration between total cost of third-party deliveries and 
the number of transformers. The idea is that since materials are especially used in specific 
plants such as substations and capacitors, the materials price can be expressed in terms of 
transforming units (substations). 
 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) 
Cost: Is the audited cost data. A fundamental point about this source of cost data is that the 
shareholder accounts and the regulatory accounts are important instruments to the firm as a 
way of sending strategic signals to shareholders and regulators. 
Cost of Capital: User cost of capital in manufacturing from the NIESR macroeconomic 
model (see Young, 1992, for a description of its construction). 




Capital Service Prices and Costs: are determining using the methods developed by 
Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) (see also Scarsi, 1999). 
 
Neuberg (1977) 
Price of Labor: Is obtained by dividing total wages and salaries for each firm by 2000 x its 
number of full-time equivalent employees.
19  
Price of Capital: Is set equal for all firms and thus collapsed in the intercept parameter. 
 
DTe (2000) 
Network Dispersion: network length per customer. 
Operating Expenditures: include materials, services, wage costs and other costs. 
 
                                                 
19 Notice that 2000 hours = (40 hours/week) x 50 weeks. Thus the author is implicitly assuming that each full-
time equivalent employee of a firm works 50 40-hour weeks in a year. Part-time employees were counted as 
halt-time employees.  
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